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Election Monitoring
in

Oromia

What Are

the
Conditions for

Democracy?
Frederick C.

Gamst

Professor Gamst, a

member of the

Joint International Observer group (JIOG),

reports the problems he monitored during the 1992 electoral
activities in the strife-ridden region

of Oromia

in Ethiopia.

campaign and voting

His analyses illumi-

nate the background institutional barriers and the politically competitive reasons

for the failure of the elections. Gamst discusses the nature of the multitudinous
Oromo people and the consequences of any election victory by them for the des-

He

tiny of Ethiopia.

election of

1992 and

also describes the sometimes violent aftermaths of the failed
its

follow-up election of 1994, in which the Oromo were
in government. He closes questioning of

again denied reasonable participation

and

U.S. policy

its

relation to the election failure.

The Emerging Conflicts of Ethnicity
after the Pax Atomica

A

political

pax atomica, technologically engendered by

the nuclear stalemate of

mutually assured destruction between the two superpowers, existed during the Cold

War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the stalemate, a bloody time
of unchecked local conflicts fueled by ideologies of ethnicity has emerged across the
world. In the dawning glow of the
cal concerns

loom:

How

new millennium,

the world's paramount ethnologi-

inviolate are the sovereignty

and

territorial integrity

of a

polynational country, and what should be the limits of ethnic self-determination, in-

cluding irredentism and secessionism?

These kinds of concerns find ever more incendiary expression, seem inextinguishable,

and sometimes have a potential for flaring into a wider conflagration

in places

such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, East Timor, Palestine,
Kurdistan, Chechnya, Chiapas, Kosovo, and virtually

glow of

the millennium, then,

is

unknown Oromia. The dawning

tinged with ethnic incandescences.

Today, ethnic wars and lesser combat total about 150 and grow in number. Modern
weaponry and other advanced technology savagely exacerbate these conflicts. Such
fighting kills and maims more civilians than soldiers, drives countless persons as refugees from their homes and livelihood, destroys property in impoverished lands, militarily expends scarce resources in have-not states, and depresses commerce in countries with inadequate levels of employment. I turn to the problem of Oromia for a
particularizing illumination of the conflagrant conflicts now flickering and flaring on
the horizon of the

new millennium.

Frederick C. Gamst, professor of anthropology, University of Massachusetts Boston, specializes in the

Horn of Africa.
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Background and Nature of the 1992
Elections in Ethiopia

During June 1992, as a member of the Joint International Observer Group (JIOGj,
helped monitor what was to become the
in

failed,

I

governmentally coerced election process

former Welega province, southwestern Ethiopia. (Before 1989, Ethiopia comprised

fourteen provinces.)

The

plan for the elections had the blessing of the United States and

other Western governments and was viewed as the

way

to bring

peace

Ethiopia. In part, the failure of the countrywide regional elections

to

war-ravaged

was fostered by a

lack of normative and institutional support for voting. In a strife-ridden country, this
voting would have resulted in giving long-contested authority to partisan "winners"

could not readily surrender what they had,
Ethiopia

is

cultures.

Many

a polynational state of

more

at

long

secured.

last, "justifiably"

who

1

than eighty ethnic groups or specific whole

ethnic groups have one or

more

usually

armed

political parties.

was

I

JIOG to the western part, former Welega, of the Oromo people's wartorn region, now called Oromia. This region has roadside debris of destroyed T-54
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and army trucks, all supplied by the former USSR.
The Oromo speak Afaan Oromo, an Eastern Cushitic language, and constitute some 45
assigned by the

percent of the Ethiopian population of perhaps 50 million, and might
in Ethiopia.

One

of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, the

A

and, formerly, in Somalia.
tural

pan-Oromo

ethnic identity

is

Oromo

number 23 million
Kenya

also live in

a recent, ever growing cul-

awakening.

The Oromo problem has bedeviled
history of the ancient

modern empire,

Ethiopia, a

creation toward the end of the nineteenth century.

2

Beginning

kingdom of Abyssinia, located

since

its

in the 1500s,

conquest

much

of the

in the northern half of today's

Ethiopia and in Eritrea, included epoch struggles between the native authoritarian

Amhara-Tigrayans, speaking Ethio-Semitic languages, and intrusive egalitarian
groups. 3 Since the 1960s, various

Oromo

Oromo

organizations have been in armed insurrection

against the sequential central governments of: the monarchy, with

its

king of kings

which destroyed the monarchy; and
the present government of Ethiopia, resulting from crushing the Derg in 1991 after
Haile Selassie

I;

the revolutionary Marxist Derg,

years of brutal civil war.

The Contesting

Political

Actors

Just before and after the 1992 elections in Ethiopia, the three principal bodies of contesting actors in western

Oromia included,

first,

the recently militarily victorious

Tigrayans from the far north of Ethiopia, with their national movement, the Ethiopian

The Tigrayans organized their
Government of Ethiopia (TGE), which preceded

People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

EPRDF

to

dominate

their Transitional

the present government of the country. Tigrayan control of the transitional government
existed before and after the elections of 1992. Control

is

through their Marxist,

for-

merly guerrilla Tigrayan People's Liberation Front and their Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. 4

The second

actor

is

the

EPRDF's

locally unpopular

Oromo

client group, the

Oromo

People's Democratic Organization, hereafter, called client-Oromo. Similar ethnic client

groups exist for other Ethiopian peoples. The

EPRDF

wields power independently of

subordinated organizations: in addition to the irregular troops of
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its

client fronts, the

its
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EPRDF
EPRDF
front

controls the military and local security forces of Ethiopia. In opposition to the

and

its

client-Oromo

broadly popular and

is

Oromo

Policy

is

is

the third actor, the

Liberation Front was the largest

government. In 1991,

all

Oromo

Liberation Front (OLF). This

often politically unwise, divisive, and separatist.

non-EPRDF

The

organization in the transitional

three fronts, along with others, finally defeated the Derg,

which controlled Ethiopia from 1976 through 1990. 5 "Others" especially include the
militarily powerful Eritrean People's Liberation Front, militarily victorious in its thirty-

plus years of bitter armed struggle in the north against the successive governments of

Ethiopia.

The

Eritreans, with their Liberation Front, represent a lesser fourth player in the

region. In 1992, the Eritreans sent peacekeepers to the

Oromo

region to separate the

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the OLF, which had been en-

gaged

Both sides were then supposed

in destructive battles.

Oromia countryside

result in part

from the struggle for

EPRDF. The

Liberation Front and the

consign their armed

this region

littering the

between the

Oromo

Eritreans, almost until election time, successfully

separated the Tigrayan troops and their
truce.

to

The Soviet-supplied vehicles

forces to specially designated holding camps.

Oromo

clients

from the

OLF

and maintained the

Enmity between the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ethiopian People's Revolu-

tionary Democratic Front

The

great,

is

currently -dominant

sometimes bloody, and appears

EPRDF

to

also has considerable opposition

be enduring.

from the once

long-dominant ethnic group of Ethiopia, the Amhara, and their independent political
front,

and from other ethnic

presentation.

Many Amhara

fronts.

These matters, however, are outside the scope of

are critical of the

TGE's

this

partitioning of the country, follow-

ing Leninist thinking, into ten ethnic administrative regions. These so-called self-gov-

erning territories, of which

Oromia

is

one, create

more problems of

ethnic friction than

they solve. With one or two exceptions of fronts not mentioned in this article,

all

the

Communist Derg were also Marxist.
Today, in conversations with representatives of some of these once unabashedly Marxist
fronts it is denied that the groups either are now or ever were Marxist. But then, at this
considerable number of fronts in opposition to the

time of the "end of history," few political groups want to use the label of passe fashion,
Marxist, anymore.

The

Political

Contest

In sub-Saharan Africa, a voter usually elects according to his or her particular ethnic
bloc. Thus, if any Ethiopian

a free and fair election

would

to risk surrender of its power by holding
some Ethiopians label it
the Oromo
The Oromo, allied with some minor groups, would at

government dared

— American

take almost half the vote.

—

style, as

last control the government and the country. But such a control is what the Amhara
and Tigrayans have always fought to prevent. (The Tigrayans suppressed their sibling

long

Amhara

in the civil

war

that

ended

in 1991.)

Paradoxically, as a consequence of the 1992 elections, the Tigrayans

would be

sur-

rendering their authority, gained only through years of costly war involving tens of

thousands of Tigrayan deaths, to one of their battlefield enemies, the Oromo. In 1992,
the Oromo observed an American-brokered truce with the Tigrayans. As I prepared to
travel to Ethiopia for the elections,

I

could not fathom

how

the Ethiopian political world

would indeed be turned upside down with the culturally alien democratic elections
advocated by the political missionaries from the West. But then, the Tigrayans
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controlling Ethiopia were allowing foreign observers to monitor their election process.

moment,

In every spare

my mind

dwelt on

sored democratic elections leading to

Ethiopian paradox of Tigrayan-spon-

this

Oromo empowerment.

(I later

learned that several

million dollars' worth of U.S. aid, desperately needed by the Tigrayans' government,

was contingent upon the holding of the 1992 elections.)
The most important aspect of the countrywide elections of 992 was democratic
1

integration of the

Oromo people and

Oromo

their

Liberation Front into the new, post-

Derg Ethiopia. In addition to the 1993 independence of the province of Eritrea, if, as
many of them desire, the Oromo were to secede from Ethiopia, the polynational country
would undoubtedly fragment still further into political chaos and economic nonviability.

Monitoring the Election Strife

My

immediate observer group, comprised of seven ardent observers using three Toyota

Land

Cruisers,

was among

the very

first to roll

out of Addis

Ababa

for the field assign-

ment. In western Oromia, our assignment was monitoring and reporting on the registration

and campaign processes prior

itself.

No

however.

to a

democratic election and then on the election

idea of a loyal opposition existed on either side in the election campaigns,

One

either supports a political-military front or

the consequences of this blatant offense. Fear

Enough

fuel

was displayed

was

is its

in the air,

enemy who must

and

for

suffer

good reason.

our vehicles' roof-mounted Jerry cans to create a blaz-

in

overweaponed countryside, and we carried cases of
Army meals. Our white vehicles were emblazoned with the Joint International Observer group's emblem, a dove and a large eye,
in blue and white. "Yeferenjibuda ayn new [Of foreigners' evil eye it is]," one Ethiopian
remarked about this arcane, to him, new symboling. When my vehicle mate and I saw
ten-year-old Oromos with hand grenades attached to their clothing, we would smile
broadly and wave energetically in a friendly fashion. Rocks would have been tolerable,
ing inferno from a potshot in the

German

bottled water and ready-to-eat U.S.

but fragmentation grenades ...
ers,

old and

In the eastern part of

good Ethiopia hands

all,

had

to leave the

Oromia, our counterpart observmonitoring

because of the palpable direct threats to their personnel's

The

Joint International Observer group

had not

three vehicles destined for western Oromia, and

planned crucial monitoring reports and the

field

prematurely

safety.

tested the short-wave radios of their

we

never could use them for the

vital security

linkage to our headquarters in

Addis Ababa. Telephone communication was available, but not always, only from western Oromia's capital of Nekemti.
"I

could have told you

that, if

someone asked me," commented our

driver,

an Ethio-

pian army combat veteran, about the limitations of our radios. Several of our skilled and

knowledgeable Ethiopian drivers were miffed
planning phase or invited to

its

at

not being consulted during the JIOG's

night-before-departure briefings. These included a

lengthy explanation of elaborate, on-paper, radio protocols and call signs and a question
session.

sway

The white bwana

still

held ethnocentrically insensitive, and thereby inefficient,

in Africa.

In the field,

we

found that the militarily powerful Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

Democratic Front and

its

Oromo

tion, coercion, illegal force, false

clients

engaged

in systematic

harassment, intimida-

accusations and imprisonment, and administrative

measures preventing the registration of peasants and townsmen in most areas controlled
by the Oromo Liberation Front. Police-state actions included jailing supporters of the
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Oromo

Liberation Front as "bandits" for mere acts of electioneering and partisan public

speech.

One "bandit" was an accredited, overworked physician. My vehicle mate and I felt
we had no authority or mandate to do anything about these political prisoners. Beyond
discussing with their government captors and visibly taking notes on the facts of their
detention,

we

was not part of a bona

said only that imprisoning the opposition

fide

election process.

A

pair of

German

Republic, went

election observers,

much

one an escapee from the German Democratic

however. They insisted, successfully, that they had the

further,

authority to visit the political prisoners, tape-record interviews with and photograph

A

them.

few of these "bandits" were consequently released.

When

I

asked the Germans

about their authority for their action regarding the political prisoners, the reply was:

"Me
I

meinen Sie? Was meinen Sie?" Yes indeed, what did I mean? What possibly could
the circumstances, repressive and dangerous to the political prisoners?

mean under

Whatever the appearance of us American observers, the Germans were not candidates
for citizenship in a police state.

Government of Ethiopia continued to place all manner of roadits formal election process, the main one being not sending the
crucial election registration books and registration cards to the many rural areas firmly
dedicated to its opposition, the Oromo Liberation Front. Thus no voting could occur in
these districts oriented to the OLF. The government thereby ensured that it did not suffer the defeat and the consequences that a democratic election would engender. (Regis-

The

Transitional

blocks in the path of

tration for voting included the designation of a person's ethnic group, a

cause for

in-

timidation.)

The
forces,
all

OLF
and

often retaliated in kind against acts of violence by government-controlled

it

sometimes attacked without immediate provocation. In western Oromia,

the observers from both sides received written

sometimes quite long, reporting

lists,

attacks on and imprisonment of people and destruction of property.

however, was relatively rare

until the

the problems with registration

Deadly violence,

end of the period for the election process.

must be

Some

of

attributed to unfamiliarity with a culturally

complexly bureaucratic procedure and to numerous local snafus.

alien,

Oromos

privately voiced their fears to

me

and

to other observers.

For example, in

one tension-ridden town, the proprietress of a coffeehouse and brothel, astonishingly,

would not take money from me and my vehicle mate for our coffees. She was so rehave us coming through town periodically in our Toyota. My fellow
observer and I hoped that our temporary and powerless presence did not imply to local

lieved, she said, to

people something
sion.

Such speech

Oromo

thought

we
in

could not ensure, protection for free political and other expres-

Oromia

we might be

is at

best foolhardy and can be personally lethal.

in their area for

mundane

(Some

matters, such as providing vac-

cine for their diseased livestock.)

My

vehicle mate and

I

found only a bare handful of

Oromo

Liberation Front offices

approximately two-thirds of western Oromia controlled by the transitional government. When we visited one such office, the two young Oromo Liberation Front irin the

regulars were astonished to see us, for they placed their

drawn

as

we

entered, behind a

wooden

counter.

AK-47

While we

assault rifles, hastily

sat chatting

with them about

the election process, first a policeman and then a surveillance type of the Transitional

Government of Ethiopia came in and stared at us and asked what we were doing
OLF post. They then stood within earshot outside the doorway.
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in the

My

co-observer and

I

patiently

worked on many problems and contradictions

At one election precinct

election activities.

in a small city,

we found

in

that the registration

of voters was greatly retarded, and reduced, because the client-Oromo member of the
mandated three-man registration committee, including a "neutral" and an OLF representative, consistently arrived several hours after the office opened early each morning.

Local

Oromo and Amhara complained

right to register.

At

first it

was

vociferously to us about this reduction of their

difficult to catch the

young uniformed client-Oromo

who was bivouacked in a camp about two hours' walk outside of town. He informed me that he could not possibly arrive earlier because of his lengthy morning trek.
soldier,

In a reply well polished in dealing with
at

4:00 A.M. or earlier to

My

the precinct.

and

was

request

his explanation

fulfill his

my

students,

entirely unreasonable;

and reply

to

me

him

told

I

to arise, if necessary,

obligation as one of the three necessary registrars at

in

my

he glowered.

I

recorded his

name

notebook and next asked the assembled

crowd of more than fifty persons what day it was, then recording their responsive symNever before had my ever-present ethnologist's field notepad wielded
such power as during that June. After all, our radio was not functioning and the city
lacked telephone service to Addis Ababa: I did not have a communication link to stand
bolic factoid.

The next day, the errant client-Oromo registrar arrived twenty minutes early. His
commander had ordered him to take lodging at one of the client-Oromo buildings in
on.

town.

Client-Oromo troops were supposed

to

be stationed

in their truce

camps, but they

armed uniformed presence in the towns. Our local protests
over this election violation were to no avail, although some troopers then began to appear without their guns. Nevertheless, those opposed to the transitional government felt
loomed

as an intimidating

endangered.
haired elder

As a result of the success with the tardy client-Oromo registrar, one graymade a public show of thanking me and grabbing my hand and kissing it

while a throng beamed

was mildly embarrassed by this display, but far
A week or so later, he came by to talk to me
in Nekemti as he fled from his province and the client-Oromo. When he left, we embraced and kissed each other twice on each cheek, in the manner of two Amhara
in approval.

more apprehensive over

I

his personal safety.

friends.

One of

TGE

most

the

Committee

telling observer experiences

was with

the three-man Zonal Election

for western Oromia, consisting of a "neutral" chairman, assigned

agency in Addis Ababa and partisan client-Oromo and

members. The committee's mission was

Oromia regarding

Oromo

to serve as the final level

from a

Liberation Front

of appeal in western

disputes over procedure and charges of foul play in the election pro-

cesses, accordingly safeguarding the success of the elections.

At our

first

meeting with

this pivotal

opening general questions, to

tell

committee, the chairman would not answer

of the election, June 21, or the names of the two partisan

—

also public

much

for

my

knowledge and men with

with the foreigners
ill

at ease

whom we

had

members

him
So
bland questions. The
sitting next to

earlier chatted amiably.

old textbook field practice of beginning with easy,

neutral chairman said he

my

us observers the well-known, publicly announced date

needed instruction from Addis Ababa before he could deal

who came

to observe in his province.

He was

to

remain constantly

with the Joint International Observer group presence.

Several days later, this neutral chairman appointed by the transitional government

expelled the opposition

The

stated reason

was

Oromo

that the

Liberation Front

member from

opposing leader had been
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the zonal committee.

late for

meetings on two occa-

New England Journal
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sions. This act solved the

problem of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic

Front's opposition raising difficult questions and concerns not being addressed.

Accordingly,

I

made a telephone

call to

JIOG

headquarters at the comfortable Hilton

Hotel in Addis Ababa regarding this highly destructive action. At
said this

wanted

was

just

to dismiss

the gravity of this

one of the problems that

my

I

report without recording

After

it.

"minor incident" and had him agree

transitional government.

The

OLF man was

first,

the

JIOG person

should expect to encounter in the

some words,

to file a

reinstated in a

I

field

and

convinced him of

formal report to the

few days,

high realized the implications of his expulsion. The highly partisan

after

someone on

EPRDF's

Transi-

Government of Ethiopia was not and could not realistically be considered a neutral party to the elections, any more than we in the United States could have solely the
Democrats or Republicans administer our national electoral process. By my conscientional

tious, unrelenting effort, I

had provided the

leaves to both the

transitional

government's election process

wondered whether
Ethiopian and American governments.

with at least one element of legitimacy.

I

I

was a provider of

fig

The Election Shambles

A

week before

the election date of June

21,1 had assessed and privately said

fellow observers that there would be no elections in the
I

was not quite correct

Oromo

region.

As

it

to

my

turned out,

in this assessment.

Complaining, four days before the twenty-first, that the election process was rigged

and

unfair, the

Oromo

Liberation Front withdrew from the elections.

withdrew from the transitional government. 6 The

Oromia

TGE

The

OLF

later

canceled the elections in the part

OLF. But the government allowed elections to proceed in
forces, as in Nekemti. At such sites, a slate of all-Oromoclient candidates ran unopposed. On election day, we observers were told by JIOG
headquarters and American embassy personnel to "monitor" (hence, legitimate) this
one-party balloting, an electoral fraud that gave "stuffing the ballot box" a good name. I
of

controlled by the

own

places tightly held by

its

did not intend to help

make genuine

a coercive police-state election.

Addis Ababa, several American obAgency for International Development
(USAID) their view that we might be serving as "window dressing" for a "show election" of the military government of Ethiopia. The USAID representative replied publicly that it was not at all the U.S. government's intention for American observers to
serve as window dressing. I took him at his word. Accordingly, on June 19 1 said I

During the day of briefing

after their arrival in

servers expressed to a facilitator of the U.S.

would not so serve on the day of the coercive one-party election
decision became moot.

in

western Oromia. But

this

With reports of increasing unrest and marked armed violence in the south, including
Oromia, reaching the concerned Joint International Observer group headquarters in
Addis Abba, our instructions for our activities in the field constantly changed. We were,
first,

ordered to stop our customary travels behind

Oromo

Liberation Front lines and

work only in the EPRDF-controlled areas. (The Oromo of the Liberation Front, with
whose members I had many intimate conversations, was, logically, extremely friendly
to us.)

Then,

we were

told to

remain

strictly inside

Nekemti town and next we were

allowed to range a limited distance out of this town. Finally, we were instructed that on
June 22, for their personal safety, the remaining Joint International Observer group
observers in western Oromia, as a group, were either to be flown or to drive in convoy
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to

Addis Ababa. This
had JIOG orders

ers

withdrawal would be on the day after

full

to

Ababa on July 21. Our two-day
lis, was without incident.
Because the JIOG had, from

trip, in

and two other observarrival

by us

Addis

in

a single vehicle on the sole road to this metropo-

the beginning,

booked

my

out of Ethiopia the morning after the elections, July 22,

had

I

complete the group's previously scheduled

explicitly instructed us to get tickets

on the sole

its

fellow observer and

me

headquarters in Addis

flight out

to fly

Ababa

of Nekemti town in the

days prior to the election. The two-engine plane was solidly booked with frightened,

Amhara women and

mostly

were

children fleeing to the safety of the national capital.

two of these passengers, using our superior

told to displace

eigner-observers. In other words,
train

from

Paris,"

we were

We

social clout as for-

ordered to depart, so to speak, on "the

last

by kicking off two refugees. What would Casablanca''s Rick have

thought of such behavior?

My

co-observer and

I

went through the motions of talking

to the Ethiopian Airlines

agent in Nekemti to see just what the consequences of our actions would be. To please
the Joint International Observer group

willing to

bump two

of the hapless

and the

women

transitional

decided to drive out of Nekemti, instead of flying.

we

government, the agent was

and children escapees for
It

was a

us.

The two of us

far better thing

we

did, in

American male norm was
"women and children first." We reported to our JIOG controllers that it was impossible
to guarantee the airplane seats from Nekemti but that they should try to secure them for
worst of times. After

this the

all,

reflected, the traditional

own Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa.
So we drove.
At first, the JIOG had directed me and two other observers from western Oromia to
return by air to Addis Ababa. This was supposed to be on election day, a day without air
service, after our early morning observations of some voting in Nekemti. After changes
in directives, we were ordered to be in transit by road beginning the day before the
us at a central office of the Ethiopian Airlines in their

by chance, we observed some Leninist one-party "da" balloting in
Shewa province, for which we had no assignment, introduction, or
whatsoever. The two other observers accompanying me also acted as wit-

elections. Thus, only

Ambo

town, former

familiarity

nesses in this informal, uninformed capacity.

The leader of

the Eritrean peacekeepers in western Oromia, mediating the truce

between the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Oromo Libera-

was an acquaintance of mine from years ago in Paris who came to see me.
Warmly holding my hand, in the customary manner of a friendly Tigrayan, he quietly
informed me that because of combat actions in the region he was withdrawing, for their
security, his peacekeepers from the far west of Oromia. For the same reasons, our feltion Front,

low three intrepid election observers

in that area

were flown

out, leaving

behind our

third Toyota.

The
ments.

OLF

move out of their truce-imposed cantonsome Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic

forces began to mobilize and

One such

force overran

Front troops north of Nekemti; another force in the far west attacked a government
election vehicle
troops.

The

and

its

escorting Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

EPRDF began

multiple responses. Like chess pieces, troops and tanks were

being deployed by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia for post-election enforce-

ment of
ter

its

authority. Prudently flying low,

(one of a few

on June 20, a Soviet-built, military helicop-

in repair) came to Nekemti and, on June 21,1 observed four empty
moving west toward Nekemti along the road from Addis Ababa.

still

flatbed tank carriers
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(Tanks are not run long distances cross-country for engagements, but instead are transported to save wear and

tear.)

The

EPRDF

—

but enforcement of social control

might, perhaps, be a novice at free elections,

was

that

its

expert activity.

The Aftermath of the Election
At a post-election evening meeting of JIOG people that I attended in Addis Abba, a
U.S. congressman visiting the capital city for the election day said the following about
the voting and about Meles Zenawi, president of Ethiopia under the transitional government: President Meles was a concerned leader; there were (only) some "problems" with
the election; and the leaving of the truce camps by the Oromo Liberation Front had
nothing to do with the election process! "Aren't congressmen insightful?" one American
observer said afterward, and other Ethiopia hands from America agreed with him as
they smiled.
In

any event, the

EPRDF made

a fundamental error in policy

outmoded Leninist ideology of using federated
specific cultures, as the basis for
tity is

the basis for the

alistic ethnicity

to

new

its

ethnicity, that

is,

when

it

followed an

a union of Soviets of

reconstruction of the Ethiopian polity.

Ethnic iden-

administrative regions of Ethiopia. Reinforcement of nation-

and the divisiveness of ethnocentrism and sectarianism were the harvest

be reaped from the Leninist seeds being sown by the transitional government. The

former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are factious and unstable examples of
such Leninist policy for a state based on ethnic blocs.

bloody miscalculation of

this

kind by the

EPRDF

"Biafraization" of the country, for example, for the

supported

movement

for an independent

stalemated political contest, the
tually turn Ethiopia into another

EPRDF

Oromia.

A

blundering and potentially

merely feeds movements for the

Oromo

It is

to

Liberation Front's well-

be hoped

that, in their near-

and the Oromo Liberation Front will not even-

former Yugoslavia.

To follow the elections of 1992, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia officially
planned for a multiparty democracy in 1993. After the elections, Tigrayan and Eritrean
forces, continuing their cooperation since 1987, moved through far western Oromia,
first

encircling and then reducing the

Oromo

Liberation Front as a military threat to the

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The

transitional

government became increasingly coercive and unwilling

pluralistic dissent or exercise of basic freedoms.

to allow

Holding private property became ever

more an anathema. As was experienced by the election organizers of the Oromo Liberation Front, disagreement by anyone with the Tigrayan Marxists in control of the TGE
became unpatriotic and criminal. Dozens of criticizing Ethiopian journalists have been
imprisoned.
Matters came to a head in January 1 993 at the campus of Addis Ababa University,
where faculty members and students openly criticized the transitional government, its
policies,

and

its

suppression of ideas.

one and wounding

EPRDF

The

troops fired at assembled students, killing

Government of Ethiopia then
missed without due process forty of the faculty members and administrators and
rectly took control of the university.
at least

On September

others.

Transitional

disdi-

1993, EPRDF troops shot and killed and wounded dozens of civilGonder town. The praying congregation had refused to scatter at the
command of the soldiers who were attempting to arrest a priest. In December 1993, a
Conference on Peace and Reconciliation met mainly at the request of political groups
7,

ians in a church in
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not in the transitional government. But the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

Democratic Force would not participate and arrested several of the conference delegates. In January 1994, the TGE expelled two nonclient ethnic fronts from the govern-

ment because of

TGE

their participation in this conference.

had narrowed largely

to the Tigrayans

and

their

The

true base of support for the

Tigrayan People's Liberation

Former president Jimmy

Front, their client fronts, plus a few quite small organizations.
7
Carter tried to mediate this dangerous situation, in vain.

The follow-up

elections to those of 1992

were

surprisingly, creating Soviet-scale results, the

new

national assembly.

On September

finally held

EPRDF won

on June

20, 1994, according to

Amnesty

hundreds of peaceful persons demonstrating against the summary
university professor and dean

On

April 19, 1995,

5,

1994. Not

89 percent of seats for the
International,

arrest of a

former

were imprisoned and beaten.

Amnesty

International charged that during

its

four-year rule, the

government of Ethiopia detained thousands without charges, made dozens vanish, and
tortured others. In September 1995, the first U.S. Peace Corps volunteers since 1977
entered Ethiopia.Some were posted to the high school in Nekemti. On October 7, 1996,
the

Committee

to Protect Journalists, in

New York,

released

its

report,

"Clampdown

in

Addis," criticizing the government's repression of journalists. In December 1996, So-

malia and Ethiopian forces clashed near Dolo.

During 1997, Amnesty International requested
the

Oromo

leaders

offense, during

its

it

arrested

that the Ethiopian

government release

and imprisoned, without having been charged with any

crackdowns against the organizations of these people. Many of these

human rights by the government. The
government accused the Oromo Liberation Front of the 1 997 bombings in Harer and
Addis Ababa, something denied by the OLF And in 1998, the Tigreans of Eritrea and
the Tigreans of Ethiopia went to war, replete with attacks of jet fighter bombers, over
leaders had merely been protesting violations of

some

contested border strips of semidesert.

Today,

Oromo

client administrators,

now governing Oromia, have

the ethnic cleansing in their region of Amhara and other
militants. In the

not put a stop to

non-Oromo persons by Oromo

Somalia region, formerly the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, Oromia, and

other regions, strife flares between local people and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

Democratic Front

soldiers.

With the Oromo Liberation Front outside the government, no effective balance to
Tigrayan power exists. In the vacuum of the disengagement of the OLF, the clientOromo assumed power under the aegis of the EPRDF. Through decentralization of
power to ethnic regions having puppet governance, the Tigrayans maintain control of
Ethiopia. Support from the West, including the United States in its Panglossian illusion,
continues for the Tigrayan government. In return for a stable government
thus, no
unpalatable

TV newscasts —

—

the United States settles for the rhetoric rather than the

substance of democracy in Ethiopia. Rewarding
ond-largest

amount of

aid

it

this

government by supplying the sec-

gives to an African country, the United States does

little to

EPRDF seek an accommodation with the majority of Oromo, Amhara, Somali,
and others not recognizing its ethnic client organizations.

have the

Perhaps the Ethiopian elections of 1992 did not

no paradox

in their

conception in

Addis Ababa —

fail in their intent.

or in Washington.

Perhaps there was

As regarding

the

former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Congo, the Bush and Clinton administrations desired to see no, hear no,

from ethnic

strife in

the

Horn

and speak no

evils of

massive

fatalities

and suffering

of Africa. To admit to the existence of such atrocities
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requires moral policymaking and leadership resulting in corrective action, unpopular for

a U.S. president seeking affirmation
polls.

from the public opinion

polls

— and the voting

$»

This speech, originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994, has been updated by the author.

Notes
1.

follows applies to the former Welega province, now the western part of Oromia,
as based upon my firsthand in-field experiences, discussions with subjects of research, and events reported to me by nine fellow observers in the province. My comments as an ethnologist, with more than three decades of experience in Ethiopia and
Ethiopian affairs, do not necessarily reflect the views of any other person or organiza-

What

tion.
2.

Emperor Menelik the Great, an Amhara, added by armed force what became his
southern, frequently Oromo, provinces to the largely Amharan and Tigrayan core
provinces of Christian Abyssinia in the north. Menelik's conquests realized an Abyssinian control of southern Ethiopia.

in the past, the Oromo refer to their Amhara-Tigrayan conquerors generally
as Habesha (Abyssinians) and individually and locally as neftenya (rifle bearers). The
Abyssinians were the newly superimposed regional armed elite, and even in the
1960s carried a rifle as a symbol of power on ceremonial occasions. In the past
Amhara-Tigrayans labeled the Oromo as the "scourge of God" and today refer to
Oromo by the prejudicial term Galla, which has a range of denotations and connotations, but it could best be explained as the Abyssinians' label for the menacing
hordes of a non-Christian, African "other." For Habesha, Galla are the kind of people
to be politically subordinated and culturally marginalized, including persecuted and
discriminated against in a wide range of overt and covert ways. During the past century or so, being Oromo means being mentally and socially marred by Abyssinians'
views of history. The interpretation of such marring is nurtured, in part, by an Oromo
intelligentsia residing in the Horn and scattered globally in the Oromo diaspora. The
Oromo are usually characterized by Western scholars as egalitarian, by which some
manner of being democratic is meant. That is, in their traditional generational system
of social organization consisting of age sets and age grades (gada), some Oromo
groups still have and most formerly had married men discussing and initiating political
and religious policies and actions, including juridical.
4. Meles Zenawi, a Marxist Tigrayan, is the president of Ethiopia. He heads the postDerg government of Ethiopia and is the leader of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), including its ethnic client organizations. Besides their
homeland in the former Tigray province on the southern border of Eritrea, the
Tigrayans are the largest and dominant ethnic group of Eritrea. Tigrayan-dominated
Eritrea was allowed its independence in 1993, against Amhara protests, by the
Tigrayan-controlled transitional government. To the anger of the Amhara, Eritreans
held many government and private commercial jobs in Addis Ababa, the capital of a
country now no longer that of the Eritreans yet one with great unemployment for the

3.

Today, as

5.

The Derg's control was effected in large part by means of several billion dollars'
worth of Soviet military aid and advice used to kill and maim hundreds of thousands
of Ethiopians. Many were murdered by the state and buried in secret mass graves.
Owing to the Derg's doctrinaire central planning and control of resources and its relentless warfare, many hundred thousands of other Ethiopians starved to death or be-

educated.

came displaced refugees.
6.

7.

Separately, in its region to the north, the independent party of the once-dominant
and numerous Amhara, the All-Amhara People's Organization, also withdrew from
the election. Other non-EPRDF fronts withdrew from the elections in their respective
areas. Elections were held in most areas, however.
On March 23, 1994, the Carter Center reported: "After extensive discussions with

leaders of opposition groups and with the government, we have been unable to find a
mutually acceptable basis for direct talks between the government and opposition

groups."
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